Iraq Study Group Report - 10% Version (Computer generated)
http://disappeardnews.com/docs/IraqStudyGWBSummary.htm

Summary:

There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq.

However, there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and protect American interests.

Our country deserves a debate that prizes substance over rhetoric, and a policy that is adequately funded and sustainable.

Because of the role and responsibility of the United States in Iraq, and the commitments our government has made, the United States has special obligations.

In this consensus report, the ten members of the Iraq Study Group present a new approach because we believe there is a better way forward.

We believe it is still possible to pursue different policies that can give Iraq an opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stabilize a critical region of the world, and protect America's credibility, interests, and values.

Our report makes it clear that the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people also must act to achieve a stable and hopeful future.

Our most important recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly.

If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government moves forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be enhanced in an important part of the world, and America's credibility, interests, and values will be protected.

Sectarian conflict is the principal challenge to stability.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation with the United States, has put forward a set of milestones critical for Iraq.

Attacks against U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi security forces are persistent and growing.

Total attacks in October 2006 averaged 180 per day, up from 70 per day in January 2006.

Daily attacks against Iraqi security forces in October were more than double the level in January.

Attacks against civilians in October were four times higher than in January.

Violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality.

There are multiple sources of violence in Iraq: the Sunni Arab insurgency, al Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, Shiite militias and death squads, and organized criminality.

Al Qaeda's goals include instigating a wider sectarian war between Iraq's Sunni and Shia, and driving the United States out of Iraq.

The perception of unchecked violence emboldens militias, shakes confidence in the government, and leads Iraqis to flee to places where their sect is the majority and where they feel they are in less danger.

The United Nations estimates that 1.6 million are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8 million Iraqis have fled the country.

The militias target Sunni Arab civilians, and some struggle for power in clashes with one another.

As the Mahdi Army has grown in size and influence, some elements have moved beyond Sadr's control.

Sistani, Sadr, Hakim The U.S. deals primarily with the Iraqi government, but the most powerful Shia figures in Iraq do not hold national office.

Of the following three vital power brokers in the Shia community, the United States is unable to talk directly with one (Grand Ayatollah Ali alSistani) and does not talk to another (Moqtada al-Sadr).

Several observers remarked to us that Sadr was following the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon: building a political party that controls basic services within the government and an armed militia outside of the government.

Sunni Arabs feel displaced because of the loss of their traditional position of power in Iraq.

Sunnis are confronted by paradoxes: they have opposed the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq but need those forces to protect them against Shia militias; they chafe at being governed by a majority Shia administration but reject a federal, decentralized Iraq and do not see a Sunni autonomous region as feasible for themselves.

The leadership of the Sunni Arab insurgency is murky, but the following two key Sunni Arab figures have broad support.

Hashimi opposes the formation of autonomous regions and has advocated the distribution of oil revenues based on population, a reversal of de-Baathification, and the removal of Shiite militia fighters from the Iraqi security forces.

The Kurds have secured a largely autonomous Kurdish region in the north, and have achieved a prominent role for Kurds within the national government.

Leading Kurdish politicians told us they preferred to be within a democratic, federal Iraqi state because an independent Kurdistan would be surrounded by hostile neighbors.

First, Sunni Arabs are generally Iraqi nationalists, albeit within the context of an Iraq they believe they should govern.

Second, because Iraq's energy resources are in the Kurdish and Shia regions, there is no economically feasible "Sunni region."

The politics of oil has the potential to further damage the country's already fragile efforts to create a unified central government.

The Iraqi Constitution leaves the door open for regions to take the lead in developing new oil resources.

Kurdish leaders have been particularly aggressive in asserting independent control of their oil assets, signing and implementing investment deals with foreign oil companies in northern Iraq.

These proposals have the potential to give all Iraqi citizens a stake in the nation's chief natural resource, but it would take time to develop a fair distribution system.

U.S.-Led Reconstruction Efforts The United States has appropriated a total of about $34 billion to support the reconstruction of Iraq, of which about $21 billion has been appropriated for the "Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund."

The coordination of assistance programs by the Defense Department, State Department, United States Agency for International Development, and other agencies has been ineffective.

The U.S. Agency for International Development, in contrast, is focused on long-term economic development and capacity building, but funds have not been committed to support these efforts into the future.

The actions of Syria and Iran in Iraq are often tied to their broader concerns with the United States.

Iran has long-standing ties to many Iraqi Shia politicians, many of whom were exiled to Iran during the Saddam Hussein regime.

Iran has provided arms, financial support, and training for Shiite militias within Iraq, as well as political support for Shia parties.

There are also reports that Iran has supplied improvised explosive devices to groups---including Sunni Arab insurgents---that attack U.S. forces.

If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world.

Continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos, and inflict greater suffering upon the Iraqi people.

A collapse of Iraq's government and economy would further cripple a country already unable to meet its people's needs.

The Iraqi people could be subjected to another strongman who flexes the political and military muscle required to impose order amid anarchy.

Iran could send in troops to restore stability in southern Iraq and perhaps gain control of oil fields.

Ambassadors from neighboring countries told us that they fear the distinct possibility of Sunni-Shia clashes across the Islamic world.

Al Qaeda will portray any failure by the United States in Iraq as a significant victory that will be featured prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region and around the world.

This loss would reduce America's global influence at a time when pressing issues in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere demand our full attention and strong U.S. leadership of international alliances.

And the longer that U.S. political and military resources are tied down in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure in Afghanistan increase.

Arguments about continuing to provide security and assistance to Iraq will fall on deaf ears if Americans become disillusioned with the government that the United States invested so much to create.

Because of the importance of Iraq, the potential for catastrophe, and the role and commitments of the United States in initiating events that have led to the current situation, we believe it would be wrong for the United States to abandon the country through a precipitate withdrawal of troops and support.

i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.

iii. Secure Iraq's borders, including the use of joint patrols with neighboring countries.

v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support, and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi government from non-neighboring Muslim nations.

vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation in Iraq.

As a complement to the diplomatic offensive, and in addition to the Support Group discussed below, the United States and the Iraqi government should support the holding of a conference or meeting in Baghdad of the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab League both to assist the Iraqi government in promoting national reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplomatic presence in Iraq.

This new diplomatic offensive cannot be successful unless it includes the active participation of those countries that have a critical stake in preventing Iraq from falling into chaos.

To encourage their participation, the United States should immediately seek the creation of the Iraq International Support Group.

It is clear to Iraq Study Group members that all of Iraq's neighbors are anxious about the situation in Iraq.

None favors the breakup of the Iraqi state.

· Turkey opposes an independent or even highly autonomous Kurdistan because of its own national security considerations.

· Iran backs Shia claims and supports various Shia militias in Iraq, but it also supports other groups in order to enhance its influence and hedge its bets on possible outcomes.

The New Diplomatic Offensive will provide the proper external environment and support for the difficult internal steps that the Iraqi government must take to promote national reconciliation, establish security, and make progress on governance.

Yet only the government and people of Iraq can make and sustain certain decisions critical to Iraq's future.

The United States should work closely with Iraq's leaders to support the achievement of specific objectives---or milestones---on national reconciliation, security, and governance.

The U.S. government must make clear that it expects action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward these milestones.

As President Bush's meeting with Prime Minister Maliki in Amman, Jordan demonstrates, it is important for the President to remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership.

The transfer of command and control over Iraqi security forces units from the United States to Iraq should be influenced by Iraq's performance on milestones.

The United States can begin to shape a positive climate for its diplomatic efforts, internationally and within Iraq, through public statements by President Bush that reject the notion that the United States seeks to control Iraq's oil, or seeks permanent military bases within Iraq.

The President and the leadership of his national security team should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership.

Political reconciliation requires the reintegration of Baathists and Arab nationalists into national life, with the leading figures of Saddam Hussein's regime excluded.

The Iraqi government should stop using the process of registering nongovernmental organizations as a tool for politicizing or stopping their activities.

The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is a key topic of interest in a national reconciliation dialogue.

There is no action the American military can take that, by itself, can bring about success in Iraq.

But there are actions that the U.S. and Iraqi governments, working together, can and should take to increase the probability of avoiding disaster there, and increase the chance of success.

The Iraqi government should accelerate the urgently needed national reconciliation program to which it has already committed.

And it should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades.

As the Iraqi Army increases in size and capability, the Iraqi government should be able to take real responsibility for governance.

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations.

We should continue to maintain support forces, rapid-reaction forces, special operations forces, intelligence units, search-and-rescue units, and force protection units.

It is clear that they will still need security assistance from the United States for some time to come as they work to achieve political and security changes.

The number of imbedded personnel would be based on the recommendation of our military commanders in Iraq, but it should be large enough to accelerate the development of a real combat capability in Iraqi Army units.

Such a mission could involve 10,000 to 20,000 American troops instead of the 3,000 to 4,000 now in this role.

Similarly, the Iraqi Border Police are charged with a role that bears little resemblance to ordinary policing, especially in light of the current flow of foreign fighters, insurgents, and weaponry across Iraq's borders and the need for joint patrols of the border with foreign militaries.

U.S. Actions The Iraqi criminal justice system is weak, and the U.S. training mission has been hindered by a lack of clarity and capacity.

It has not always been clear who is in charge of the police training mission, and the U.S. military lacks expertise in certain areas pertaining to police and the rule of law.

The U.S. Department of Defense is already bearing too much of the burden in Iraq.

Meanwhile, the pool of expertise in the United States on policing and the rule of law has been underutilized.

The United States should adjust its training mission in Iraq to match the recommended changes in the Iraqi government---the movement of the National and Border Police to the Ministry of Defense and the new emphasis on the Iraqi Police Service within the Ministry of the Interior.

The U.S. Department of Defense should continue its mission to train the Iraqi National Police and the Iraqi Border Police, which should be placed within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.

The Iraqi government should provide funds to expand and upgrade communications equipment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service.

Since the success of the oil sector is critical to the success of the Iraqi economy, the United States must do what it can to help Iraq maximize its capability.

· As soon as possible, the U.S. government should provide technical assistance to the Iraqi government to prepare a draft oil law that defines the rights of regional and local governments and creates a fiscal and legal framework for investment.

Building the capacity of the Iraqi government should be at the heart of U.S. reconstruction efforts, and capacity building demands additional U.S. resources.

The Senior Advisor's responsibility must be to bring unity of effort to the policy, budget, and implementation of economic reconstruction programs in Iraq.

The Iraqi government must improve its intelligence capability, initially to work with the United States, and ultimately to take full responsibility for this intelligence function.

To facilitate enhanced Iraqi intelligence capabilities, the CIA should increase its personnel in Iraq to train Iraqi intelligence personnel.

The CIA should also develop, with Iraqi officials, a counterterrorism intelligence center for the all-source fusion of information on the various sources of terrorism within Iraq.

This center would analyze data concerning the individuals, organizations, networks, and support groups involved in terrorism within Iraq.

It would also facilitate intelligence-led police and military actions against them.

The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq to develop and train an effective intelligence service and to build a counterterrorism intelligence center that will facilitate intelligence-led counterterrorism efforts.